Posts
What if everything you'd written on a topic over the last decade could be poured into an AI that interacts with you to develop and explore new insights and ideas?
This morning I've started testing our proof of concept 'digital brain', which has read, absorbed and contextualised everything I've written in my eGov.AU blog since 2006, plus more.
Even in early testing it's capable of extending and connecting ideas in ways I'd never considered, generating new insights and highlighting new knowledge paths to explore in near-perfect prose.
This is not simply a curiosity or tool for an individual writer & thinker.
Imagine the value such a 'digital brain' could generate as a digital team member in an organisation.
As a digital team member, our AI is already able to ingest, read, connect and continually remember virtually all the knowledge your organisation has captured in written form (soon audio as well).
It can repurpose your corporate knowledge to produce new insights, suggest new ideas and draft documents (training, sales, marcomms, compliance and more) so your human teams can focus more on creative and editorial contributions.
And we're continuing to explore and extend these capabilities to make an AI digital team member a core part of an organisation's operational stack.
So your organisation can make full use of the hard-won corporate knowledge you've already acquired to generate ongoing sustained value and support your human teams.
Showing posts with label digital. Show all posts
Showing posts with label digital. Show all posts
Monday, February 28, 2022
The first truly digital officer | Tweet |
Thursday, October 31, 2019
Digital is boring - it's time for purpose-based transformation | Tweet |
One reason I've posted less frequently in this blog over the last few years is that, frankly, digital in government has become boring.
Digital is now well-embedded in virtually every agency and council at every level of government in Australia and New Zealand, and mobile & online have now been the primary channels for citizens to engage governments for almost ten years.
My predictions back in 2006 that all government communicators would have to understand digital tools as part of their engagement mix have largely been realised, with social being well integrated into agency communications. Albeit this is still far too outbound only for my taste in many organisations & there's continuing overly restrictive social media rules in place for public servants via the APSC which I know are causing a number of quality candidates to avoid applying for government roles.
Cloud is widespread, if not fully understood or embraced and open source and open data are part of the landscape - although there's not been the full value yet realised in my humble opinion.
Digital as a profession has splintered into a range of specialist roles, with clear career paths and their own conference circuits and communities of practice. Meanwhile digital savvy senior executives are no longer as rare as hen's teeth, albeit not yet as common as Canberra taxi drivers with political opinions to share.
Design Thinking and Innovation are everywhere (even buzzwords), and Agile has climbed out of ICT into policy and service delivery spaces, adding value in most places it touches.
It's true that many agencies are still in the throes of Digital Transformation - but this has moved largely on from updating foundational systems to true value creation.
In sum government has advanced in how it understands and uses digital to improve governance and service delivery while reducing costs, however similar to the old tale of King Midas, Digital has become more Bureaucratised - something government does to everything it touches - fit into the hierarchy and tamed, rather than transforming the basis of how agencies govern.
As such I think it is time to stop talking 'digital transformation' and start talking 'purpose-based transformation'.
Previous Digital Transformation often (incorrectly) put the emphasis on the Digital rather than the Transformation, being more of a lift & shift approach where governments supplemented or replaced physical transactions and locations with digital equivalents.
There was some service transformation undertaken, with each process looked at individually, or even within the context of specific personas and life events, to redesign them to be slightly easier to use. However there haven't been the mechanisms in place (structure, financing, capabilities or legal frameworks) to reinvent the relationship between government and citizen, or government and stakeholder, or government and supplier.
As a result, despite shiny new online transactional services, supporting systems and growth in their use, there's still overall a lack of clarity in many agencies about how these transactions meet or support the overall purpose of the agency itself. While the transaction might be seamless and secure, what is the 'price signal' it gives to citizens using it?
Are citizens nudged to be good auto-shoppers, self-servicing their needs, or is there a bigger purpose being met in how these digital services help citizens to meet their actual needs, rather than complete a form and press a button?
Purpose-based Transformation, which I raised in a conversation over lunch with Pia Andrews this week, is all about getting back to understanding the roots of why an organisation exists and what is is trying to achieve. It is then about testing whether the current organisational design has a laser sharp focus on fulfilling that purpose through their every interaction - whether with citizens, organisations or other agencies.
Revisiting, and restating that underlying purpose and validating whether the organisation is currently fit for it becomes the first step in a transformation approach that builds on everything we've learn through digital and focuses it on the value proposition of the organisation, rather than the value stream from a specific service or process.
Taking a purpose-based approach allows an agency to think about all its procedures, processes, services and systems from a different perspective. One that is ultimately user centric through a focus on why the organisation exists and expressly seeks to achieve.
In this Purpose-based transformation context, Digital becomes an enabler of the approach and new experiences, rather than an end in its own right.
The goal is measured based on how well the purpose is delivered, rather than on the take-up and cost-savings from transactions.
The outcome of such a Purpose-based Transformation is a redesign of the structure and organisational procedures, systems and services - root and branch - leveraging digital to rethink the entire organisation from the ground up, not simply for specific processes or systems.
Imagine what could be achieved with a purpose-based transformation to address some of the underlying challenges that digital transformations have sometimes simply wallpapered over.
Digital is now well-embedded in virtually every agency and council at every level of government in Australia and New Zealand, and mobile & online have now been the primary channels for citizens to engage governments for almost ten years.
My predictions back in 2006 that all government communicators would have to understand digital tools as part of their engagement mix have largely been realised, with social being well integrated into agency communications. Albeit this is still far too outbound only for my taste in many organisations & there's continuing overly restrictive social media rules in place for public servants via the APSC which I know are causing a number of quality candidates to avoid applying for government roles.
Cloud is widespread, if not fully understood or embraced and open source and open data are part of the landscape - although there's not been the full value yet realised in my humble opinion.
Digital as a profession has splintered into a range of specialist roles, with clear career paths and their own conference circuits and communities of practice. Meanwhile digital savvy senior executives are no longer as rare as hen's teeth, albeit not yet as common as Canberra taxi drivers with political opinions to share.
Design Thinking and Innovation are everywhere (even buzzwords), and Agile has climbed out of ICT into policy and service delivery spaces, adding value in most places it touches.
It's true that many agencies are still in the throes of Digital Transformation - but this has moved largely on from updating foundational systems to true value creation.
In sum government has advanced in how it understands and uses digital to improve governance and service delivery while reducing costs, however similar to the old tale of King Midas, Digital has become more Bureaucratised - something government does to everything it touches - fit into the hierarchy and tamed, rather than transforming the basis of how agencies govern.
As such I think it is time to stop talking 'digital transformation' and start talking 'purpose-based transformation'.
Previous Digital Transformation often (incorrectly) put the emphasis on the Digital rather than the Transformation, being more of a lift & shift approach where governments supplemented or replaced physical transactions and locations with digital equivalents.
There was some service transformation undertaken, with each process looked at individually, or even within the context of specific personas and life events, to redesign them to be slightly easier to use. However there haven't been the mechanisms in place (structure, financing, capabilities or legal frameworks) to reinvent the relationship between government and citizen, or government and stakeholder, or government and supplier.
As a result, despite shiny new online transactional services, supporting systems and growth in their use, there's still overall a lack of clarity in many agencies about how these transactions meet or support the overall purpose of the agency itself. While the transaction might be seamless and secure, what is the 'price signal' it gives to citizens using it?
Are citizens nudged to be good auto-shoppers, self-servicing their needs, or is there a bigger purpose being met in how these digital services help citizens to meet their actual needs, rather than complete a form and press a button?
Purpose-based Transformation, which I raised in a conversation over lunch with Pia Andrews this week, is all about getting back to understanding the roots of why an organisation exists and what is is trying to achieve. It is then about testing whether the current organisational design has a laser sharp focus on fulfilling that purpose through their every interaction - whether with citizens, organisations or other agencies.
Revisiting, and restating that underlying purpose and validating whether the organisation is currently fit for it becomes the first step in a transformation approach that builds on everything we've learn through digital and focuses it on the value proposition of the organisation, rather than the value stream from a specific service or process.
Taking a purpose-based approach allows an agency to think about all its procedures, processes, services and systems from a different perspective. One that is ultimately user centric through a focus on why the organisation exists and expressly seeks to achieve.
In this Purpose-based transformation context, Digital becomes an enabler of the approach and new experiences, rather than an end in its own right.
The goal is measured based on how well the purpose is delivered, rather than on the take-up and cost-savings from transactions.
The outcome of such a Purpose-based Transformation is a redesign of the structure and organisational procedures, systems and services - root and branch - leveraging digital to rethink the entire organisation from the ground up, not simply for specific processes or systems.
Imagine what could be achieved with a purpose-based transformation to address some of the underlying challenges that digital transformations have sometimes simply wallpapered over.
Tuesday, May 15, 2018
If exposure to social media messages can affect human moods & more, what responsibility do digital marketers & organisations hold? | Tweet |
There's a lot of evidence available now that the emotional tone of the messaging that people are exposed to on social media goes on to affect their mood, posting behaviour, and aspects of their health and actions.
A study by Facebook and Cornell University in 2012 (published in 2014) that involved modifying the emotional valance of posts on 689,003 users' Facebook News Feeds, putting aside the ethics of experimenting unknowingly on their users, evidenced a strong link between what people saw in their Feed and the emotional valance of what they posted afterwards.
The study postulated that 'emotional contagion' was very strong in social media channels, with the capability for peoples' moods and behaviours to be significantly altered through exposure to messaging that expressed certain tones or viewpoints.
Other research has validated connections between the emotional tone of the social and digital media we consume and the behaviours we exhibit - which really should not come as a surprise as it is the basis of the advertising, propaganda and marketing industries (using emotional triggers to stimulate behaviour change) and is readily visible in the mood swings evident in forum, Facebook and Twitter conversations over time.
So if we can be fairly confident that emotional tone is 'contagious', and that emotions then influence behaviours, what is the responsibility of communicators and marketers when using digital and social media to engage audiences at scale to 'set' the right tone?
I've long been a proponent of having clear community guidelines for communities that government agencies and companies establish in order to set the appropriate context and tone for conversations up front. Failing to do this can lead to communities rapidly moving beyond the influence of the establishing organisation and having conversational tone going to places that are undesirable or damaging.
However even when posting or promoting material through general digital channels there can be a significant impact on audience mood and behaviour depending on the approach taken by the organisation - even for 'emotionless' statements of fact that could be perceived in negative or positive ways.
Simply stating the facts and taking no responsibility for the audience's emotional reaction is a common, but flawed strategy, when it is used as a way to justify that the organisation is blameless as to how others react (and I have to admit that I've used this to 'excuse' myself in personal conversations as well).
While it isn't always possible to predict how a group, or particularly how an individual, will react to a given message, we can design and test our messaging to bias toward a particular emotional and behavioural response.
This could be seen as manipulative, but arguably is no more manipulative than dropping unpleasant information in a factual manner and then blaming the negative reaction on the 'receivers'. Whenever we communicate we are aim to have an impact, so it only behooves us to strive to minimise any harm that could come from our communications as far as is possible.
So when participating or advertising online, digital marketers need to develop a sound understanding of their audiences and be mindful of the impacts of our communications - much as how newspapers now provide support line contact details at the end of disturbing articles.
When emotional contagion takes hold and amplifies an emotional or behavioural response - whether for good or ill, the impacts can be enormous - and digital marketers and communicators need to own their contribution in these cases.
A study by Facebook and Cornell University in 2012 (published in 2014) that involved modifying the emotional valance of posts on 689,003 users' Facebook News Feeds, putting aside the ethics of experimenting unknowingly on their users, evidenced a strong link between what people saw in their Feed and the emotional valance of what they posted afterwards.
The study postulated that 'emotional contagion' was very strong in social media channels, with the capability for peoples' moods and behaviours to be significantly altered through exposure to messaging that expressed certain tones or viewpoints.
Other research has validated connections between the emotional tone of the social and digital media we consume and the behaviours we exhibit - which really should not come as a surprise as it is the basis of the advertising, propaganda and marketing industries (using emotional triggers to stimulate behaviour change) and is readily visible in the mood swings evident in forum, Facebook and Twitter conversations over time.
So if we can be fairly confident that emotional tone is 'contagious', and that emotions then influence behaviours, what is the responsibility of communicators and marketers when using digital and social media to engage audiences at scale to 'set' the right tone?
I've long been a proponent of having clear community guidelines for communities that government agencies and companies establish in order to set the appropriate context and tone for conversations up front. Failing to do this can lead to communities rapidly moving beyond the influence of the establishing organisation and having conversational tone going to places that are undesirable or damaging.
However even when posting or promoting material through general digital channels there can be a significant impact on audience mood and behaviour depending on the approach taken by the organisation - even for 'emotionless' statements of fact that could be perceived in negative or positive ways.
Simply stating the facts and taking no responsibility for the audience's emotional reaction is a common, but flawed strategy, when it is used as a way to justify that the organisation is blameless as to how others react (and I have to admit that I've used this to 'excuse' myself in personal conversations as well).
While it isn't always possible to predict how a group, or particularly how an individual, will react to a given message, we can design and test our messaging to bias toward a particular emotional and behavioural response.
This could be seen as manipulative, but arguably is no more manipulative than dropping unpleasant information in a factual manner and then blaming the negative reaction on the 'receivers'. Whenever we communicate we are aim to have an impact, so it only behooves us to strive to minimise any harm that could come from our communications as far as is possible.
So when participating or advertising online, digital marketers need to develop a sound understanding of their audiences and be mindful of the impacts of our communications - much as how newspapers now provide support line contact details at the end of disturbing articles.
When emotional contagion takes hold and amplifies an emotional or behavioural response - whether for good or ill, the impacts can be enormous - and digital marketers and communicators need to own their contribution in these cases.
Monday, January 30, 2017
Governments need to think about productivity in society-wide terms, not just in terms of the public service | Tweet |
There's been enormous coverage of the new Centrelink debt letters process, whereby the Department of Human Services has automated the process of matching data from the ATO and Centrelink to try to find overpayments (but not underpayments) in welfare benefits to Australia.
The automation has involved removing human quality assurance steps, which has led to the number of debt checking letters growing from 20,000 per year to 20,000 per week. Over 260,000 of these letters have been sent out to-date.
Now automated data-matching can be a fantastic thing when used well. It can reduce duplication in identification processes, find patterns and trends that inform polices and service delivery, and even identify inaccurate payments - as was the intention with this approach.
However for a data-matching process to work well, the system rules need to be well-designed and tested, and the data needs to be comparable so as to be matchable.
The widespread issues that are being reported by former and current Centrelink payment recipients and the enormous (more than 350 articles over the last month) of media coverage suggest that the system that Centrelink put in place meet neither of these conditions.
Without going into the apparent system issues, which have been covered widely, the reason Centrelink and other agencies introduce automated systems is to allow them to achieve the same, or better, outcomes with fewer staff - something that in economic terms lifts the productivity of the agency.
Centrelink has reduced its workforce by around 5,000 staff over the last five years, and moved to have a larger casual workforce with fewer permanent staff. These types of changes are occurring across many large public sector organisations as governments tighten their belts.
However it seems that when governments today act to (hopefully) bring about productivity gains and cost cuts, they focus primarily on a subset of the economy, the public service.
They appear to overlook the potential impacts on other sectors, or the overall productivity or cost dividend to the community they serve.
Let's use the Centrelink situation as an example. By cutting a human quality assurance step, and using a purely automated approach for identifying potential overpayments, Centrelink has transferred the cost of checking that their data is accurate from internal staff to welfare recipients.
Now while it may be appropriate for the people receiving the payments to be responsible for justifying why they receive them, there is a significant productivity cost when passing the task of quality assuring claims from trained and experienced staff with strong systems supporting them to low income, sometimes low education, citizens.
This productivity cost is exacerbated when these citizens are expected to re-prove their eligibility for past welfare payments, dating back as far as six years. The citizens now must track down former employers, landlords and education providers to source the materials that Centrelink has decided it now requires (often for a second or third time) to revalidate past payments.
So not only are individual citizens required to spend significant time checking the documentation Centrelink holds on them (which is subject to errors from mistaken entry by Centrelink staff and algorithmic mistakes, such as averaging a citizen's part-time or sporadic pay over 26 fortnightly periods), but must also involve the time of a range of former employers and landlords.
Now I've been going through an employment process (you'll hear more about this shortly), which required me to source a range of documents from 4-6 years ago from former employers - both public and private sector. While not the same as the process welfare recipients are facing, it required similar information such as old payslips and employment dates.
All the organisations were very prompt in responding (thanks to you all), taking no more than two weeks to pull together what was required - however I estimate that the combined time they spent on this one matter for me exceeded ten hours work time, just for one person in one clearcut situation.
For the 260,000 welfare recipients who may have to re-source material from employers and others, this time adds up to potentially millions of hours of lost productivity for the companies involved - that's outside the time spent by the welfare recipients themselves to 'prove' they were not overpaid, or not as much as Centrelink claims they were.
The Minister for Human Services suggested before Christmas that around $300 million in debt had been recovered, this was later revised to being debt identified, with neither the Minister nor Department able to conclusively say how much had actually been paid to the Commonwealth.
Now let's look at a few estimates.
Welfare recipients are reporting that they are spending up to dozens of hours resolving this matter with Centrelink. That includes pulling together documents, dealing with former employers. waiting on the phone with Centrelink for up to four hours, with multiple call-backs for dropped lines, managing difficulties with MyGov and other associated activities.
For past recipients (who may have spent a few months or years on welfare when studying or during gaps in employment) who are currently employed, this can require non-productive time in business hours while at work (the only time Centrelink takes calls) and cutting into other job-related or educational activities outside hours.
In addition their former employers and educational institutions are spending hours pulling up old payslips from archives - noting that where employers have shut-down this becomes even more difficult and time consuming.
If we assume that the average welfare recipient is spending 6 hours on dealing with their Centrelink debt and that former employers are spending another 4 hours servicing their requests to meet DHS requirements, that's 10 hours productivity lost per debt notice.
Now if we assume that 60% of debt notices require this time investment, based on 260,000 notices issued, that's 156,000 debt notices on which people are spending 10 hours each on resolving - whether or not there is an overpayment at the end of the process.
Let's take a hourly rate of $30 - low for Australia - as the dollar cost of those hours. Based on 156,000 notices at 10 hours effort (1,560,000 hours effort total), at that dollar rate the cost to the economy is $46.8 million dollars.
Now that's the direct productivity cost to citizens and businesses. On top of that there's been extensive involvement by not-for-profit legal and counselling services dealing with an upsurge in complaints and counselling needs and the mental and physical distress people facing large unexpected Centrelink debt notices are currently facing, harming their ongoing productivity and effectiveness.
There's also time spent by citizens on social media engagement, the creation and management of the NotMyDebt website and, finally, the time being spent by Centrelink's own staff sorting out debt issues which could have been easily screened out through a QA process.
I'd estimate from the above that the net productivity cost to Australia of saving Centrelink's QA step is already approaching about $80 million, without considering the longer-term cost of the loss of credibility and potential impact that will have on future productivity.
While the Commonwealth may be able to claw back this amount of money via the debt notices, I think that the situation is already well past the point where the situation has a net productivity loss to Australia as a society.
In other words, the cost of reclaiming this debt in this manner, is significantly outweighed by the overall productivity cost to the country. Sure it might make a good political statement for a 'no-nonsense' approach to welfare (though this appears challenged by poll results), but the economic cost makes the approach very hard to justify from a pragmatic perspective.
Government is likely to face more and more of these types of situations as it attempts to lift productivity and/or cut costs by transferring the work done by staff back onto citizens.
While I understand the importance of cost management in government, and the ongoing desire to lift productivity, looking at these metrics based on public sector inputs rather than society-wide outputs does risk governments making decisions that harm economy-wide productivity in the long-term when chasing short-term productivity gains for a specific government agency.
Governments who wish to see long-term economic gains need to carefully consider how they shift effort from experienced staff to inexperienced citizens in order to not increase burdens that reduce overall productivity and wipe out the public sector savings through lower tax receipts or large pushback costs.
Digital transformation is a key tool in this process, but must be used wisely, not simply to automate steps to remove humans, but to simultaneously cut errors and improve success-rates.
The current Centrelink debt issue is a clear example of what happens when a good automation idea is executed poorly, becoming an overall loss to government rather than a win.
The automation has involved removing human quality assurance steps, which has led to the number of debt checking letters growing from 20,000 per year to 20,000 per week. Over 260,000 of these letters have been sent out to-date.
Now automated data-matching can be a fantastic thing when used well. It can reduce duplication in identification processes, find patterns and trends that inform polices and service delivery, and even identify inaccurate payments - as was the intention with this approach.
However for a data-matching process to work well, the system rules need to be well-designed and tested, and the data needs to be comparable so as to be matchable.
The widespread issues that are being reported by former and current Centrelink payment recipients and the enormous (more than 350 articles over the last month) of media coverage suggest that the system that Centrelink put in place meet neither of these conditions.
Without going into the apparent system issues, which have been covered widely, the reason Centrelink and other agencies introduce automated systems is to allow them to achieve the same, or better, outcomes with fewer staff - something that in economic terms lifts the productivity of the agency.
Centrelink has reduced its workforce by around 5,000 staff over the last five years, and moved to have a larger casual workforce with fewer permanent staff. These types of changes are occurring across many large public sector organisations as governments tighten their belts.
However it seems that when governments today act to (hopefully) bring about productivity gains and cost cuts, they focus primarily on a subset of the economy, the public service.
They appear to overlook the potential impacts on other sectors, or the overall productivity or cost dividend to the community they serve.
Let's use the Centrelink situation as an example. By cutting a human quality assurance step, and using a purely automated approach for identifying potential overpayments, Centrelink has transferred the cost of checking that their data is accurate from internal staff to welfare recipients.
Now while it may be appropriate for the people receiving the payments to be responsible for justifying why they receive them, there is a significant productivity cost when passing the task of quality assuring claims from trained and experienced staff with strong systems supporting them to low income, sometimes low education, citizens.
This productivity cost is exacerbated when these citizens are expected to re-prove their eligibility for past welfare payments, dating back as far as six years. The citizens now must track down former employers, landlords and education providers to source the materials that Centrelink has decided it now requires (often for a second or third time) to revalidate past payments.
So not only are individual citizens required to spend significant time checking the documentation Centrelink holds on them (which is subject to errors from mistaken entry by Centrelink staff and algorithmic mistakes, such as averaging a citizen's part-time or sporadic pay over 26 fortnightly periods), but must also involve the time of a range of former employers and landlords.
Now I've been going through an employment process (you'll hear more about this shortly), which required me to source a range of documents from 4-6 years ago from former employers - both public and private sector. While not the same as the process welfare recipients are facing, it required similar information such as old payslips and employment dates.
All the organisations were very prompt in responding (thanks to you all), taking no more than two weeks to pull together what was required - however I estimate that the combined time they spent on this one matter for me exceeded ten hours work time, just for one person in one clearcut situation.
For the 260,000 welfare recipients who may have to re-source material from employers and others, this time adds up to potentially millions of hours of lost productivity for the companies involved - that's outside the time spent by the welfare recipients themselves to 'prove' they were not overpaid, or not as much as Centrelink claims they were.
The Minister for Human Services suggested before Christmas that around $300 million in debt had been recovered, this was later revised to being debt identified, with neither the Minister nor Department able to conclusively say how much had actually been paid to the Commonwealth.
Now let's look at a few estimates.
Welfare recipients are reporting that they are spending up to dozens of hours resolving this matter with Centrelink. That includes pulling together documents, dealing with former employers. waiting on the phone with Centrelink for up to four hours, with multiple call-backs for dropped lines, managing difficulties with MyGov and other associated activities.
For past recipients (who may have spent a few months or years on welfare when studying or during gaps in employment) who are currently employed, this can require non-productive time in business hours while at work (the only time Centrelink takes calls) and cutting into other job-related or educational activities outside hours.
In addition their former employers and educational institutions are spending hours pulling up old payslips from archives - noting that where employers have shut-down this becomes even more difficult and time consuming.
If we assume that the average welfare recipient is spending 6 hours on dealing with their Centrelink debt and that former employers are spending another 4 hours servicing their requests to meet DHS requirements, that's 10 hours productivity lost per debt notice.
Now if we assume that 60% of debt notices require this time investment, based on 260,000 notices issued, that's 156,000 debt notices on which people are spending 10 hours each on resolving - whether or not there is an overpayment at the end of the process.
Let's take a hourly rate of $30 - low for Australia - as the dollar cost of those hours. Based on 156,000 notices at 10 hours effort (1,560,000 hours effort total), at that dollar rate the cost to the economy is $46.8 million dollars.
Now that's the direct productivity cost to citizens and businesses. On top of that there's been extensive involvement by not-for-profit legal and counselling services dealing with an upsurge in complaints and counselling needs and the mental and physical distress people facing large unexpected Centrelink debt notices are currently facing, harming their ongoing productivity and effectiveness.
There's also time spent by citizens on social media engagement, the creation and management of the NotMyDebt website and, finally, the time being spent by Centrelink's own staff sorting out debt issues which could have been easily screened out through a QA process.
I'd estimate from the above that the net productivity cost to Australia of saving Centrelink's QA step is already approaching about $80 million, without considering the longer-term cost of the loss of credibility and potential impact that will have on future productivity.
While the Commonwealth may be able to claw back this amount of money via the debt notices, I think that the situation is already well past the point where the situation has a net productivity loss to Australia as a society.
In other words, the cost of reclaiming this debt in this manner, is significantly outweighed by the overall productivity cost to the country. Sure it might make a good political statement for a 'no-nonsense' approach to welfare (though this appears challenged by poll results), but the economic cost makes the approach very hard to justify from a pragmatic perspective.
Government is likely to face more and more of these types of situations as it attempts to lift productivity and/or cut costs by transferring the work done by staff back onto citizens.
While I understand the importance of cost management in government, and the ongoing desire to lift productivity, looking at these metrics based on public sector inputs rather than society-wide outputs does risk governments making decisions that harm economy-wide productivity in the long-term when chasing short-term productivity gains for a specific government agency.
Governments who wish to see long-term economic gains need to carefully consider how they shift effort from experienced staff to inexperienced citizens in order to not increase burdens that reduce overall productivity and wipe out the public sector savings through lower tax receipts or large pushback costs.
Digital transformation is a key tool in this process, but must be used wisely, not simply to automate steps to remove humans, but to simultaneously cut errors and improve success-rates.
The current Centrelink debt issue is a clear example of what happens when a good automation idea is executed poorly, becoming an overall loss to government rather than a win.
Thursday, January 19, 2017
90% of digital disruption is still to come (podcast) | Tweet |
A few months ago I interviewed with Andrew Ramsden of AlphaTransform, who has spent the last year capturing the thoughts of digital leaders around Australia (he also has a book in the works).
He's now published the interview as Episode 16 in his Alpha Geek Podcast - which is definitely worth checking out.
You can listen to the interview below, in which I suggest that we're still at the start of the digital transformation journey for society, for business and for government...
He's now published the interview as Episode 16 in his Alpha Geek Podcast - which is definitely worth checking out.
You can listen to the interview below, in which I suggest that we're still at the start of the digital transformation journey for society, for business and for government...
Thursday, December 08, 2016
Ensuring that digital transformation delivers the right outcomes for Australia's Government | Tweet |
I wrote this post in response to a LinkedIn conversation around this article, Digital government could become just more cost cutting, warns Internet Australia - which should be read first for context.
Digital transformation should never focus on the digital, it's about transformation.
Digital is a toolset and has opened new doors to how services and organisations may be transformed - however the culture and structural changes must occur or any digitalisation of services is simply a bandaid measure that will have little impact on the effectiveness or productivity of an organisation in the long-term.
The public service has, and continues, to resist cultural and structural reform for three main reasons:
The political end of government is slowly being less well served by public servants but, from the evidence at hand and my conversations, doesn't always know what to do about it.
They're busy fighting ideological battles over control and interests to get, or retain, power and largely do not have executive experience within large organisations - essentially they lack the skills to lead change in government, as do many public sector leaders whose roles are about maintaining the status quo and serving the government of the day, not retooling the public service for the future.
As a result we're seeing a slow decay in our institutions, a hollowing out of the talent pool (with good people fiercely contested over and 'deadwood' slipped into Machinery of Government changes where agencies can offload them, as managing them out is too hard) and increasing brittleness as capability is lost.
The average tenure for a public servant is ten years, and 77% have only worked in one agency - down on past years, but still indicative of organisations that are very comfortable and safe places to work - whereas private sector 'imports' on average last 3 years (less in senior roles) before leaving for greener pastures.
How do we fix this situation?
Good question - it requires effort at all levels, including:
How likely is this approach?
Right now it doesn't look particularly likely to me, as an external observer, but here are a few areas where progress could be made.
With that rate of change and uncertainty potentially continuing, it's hard to see how the Australian Government will continue to thrive without taking some of the steps above.
Digital transformation should never focus on the digital, it's about transformation.
Digital is a toolset and has opened new doors to how services and organisations may be transformed - however the culture and structural changes must occur or any digitalisation of services is simply a bandaid measure that will have little impact on the effectiveness or productivity of an organisation in the long-term.
The public service has, and continues, to resist cultural and structural reform for three main reasons:
- The current cultures and structures suit the people in charge. They've benefited from the current system and have been normalised into it, making it difficult and frightening to consider changes and reforms.
- The status quo is supported by legislation, policies, rulings and lived experience ('it's how we've always done it'). Changing culture and structure is hard when it is shaped by these influences and requires disruptive, not incremental, steps to make strong inroads (such as creating new agencies or having all staff re-apply for adjusted roles).
- There's little urgency for change. The public sector is seeing a slow leaching of budgets and talent but, similar to the analogy of boiling a frog, the water is heating too slowly for the frog to get concerned and hop out, until it is too late. While many agencies now have innovation programs in place, with some real successes coming from these, they still tend to mostly focus on fringe and low priority areas, 'safe' areas that don't threaten existing structures, services or operational modes.
The political end of government is slowly being less well served by public servants but, from the evidence at hand and my conversations, doesn't always know what to do about it.
They're busy fighting ideological battles over control and interests to get, or retain, power and largely do not have executive experience within large organisations - essentially they lack the skills to lead change in government, as do many public sector leaders whose roles are about maintaining the status quo and serving the government of the day, not retooling the public service for the future.
As a result we're seeing a slow decay in our institutions, a hollowing out of the talent pool (with good people fiercely contested over and 'deadwood' slipped into Machinery of Government changes where agencies can offload them, as managing them out is too hard) and increasing brittleness as capability is lost.
The average tenure for a public servant is ten years, and 77% have only worked in one agency - down on past years, but still indicative of organisations that are very comfortable and safe places to work - whereas private sector 'imports' on average last 3 years (less in senior roles) before leaving for greener pastures.
How do we fix this situation?
Good question - it requires effort at all levels, including:
- Working to upskill upcoming politicians and their advisors to understand how to work effectively and lead the public sector,
- working with senior bureaucrats to develop and supplement their knowledge and skills,
- working with mid-tier Managers (future senior bureaucrats) to shift their track before they become too embedded in existing culture, and
- working with staff to push responsibility downhill, with strong KPIs that can be used to weed out the unsuitable and support and reward high achievers.
How likely is this approach?
Right now it doesn't look particularly likely to me, as an external observer, but here are a few areas where progress could be made.
- Rewarding talent
The public sector's pay scales do not foster or encourage consideration of the APS as a career option, providing little to no room for individual outperformance or achievement.
The government's pay policy, as being carried forward by the APSC, is a strong disincentive for external talent to work for the public service as staff. The lack of rewards and diminishing flexibility, with long-term pay disputes in progress for over three years, leaving public sector wages stagnant in many places, falling below private sector equivalents, do not encourage private sector talent to consider the richness, diversity and opportunity to create national change that exists across public sector roles.
- Unnecessary movementsUnnecessary movement must stop - such as Deputy Prime Minister Joyce's 'pet project' of moving agricultural agencies out of the bush capital (which is surrounded by farms), costing enormous amounts of money, lost time through disruption and skills loss, as most will not move away from career opportunities or families to work in locations where their access to other agencies they must work with, and parliament, is far diminished.
Also the incessant shifts of parts of agencies to other agencies (Machinery of Government changes, or MOGs) must cease - with portfolios defined and set for a decade at a time, with reviews of their responsibilities occurring independent of political dictates as broad engagement processes looking at best practice across public and private sector organisations globally and consultation processes with staff, thought leaders and politicians, who then are appointed to specific portfolios or cross-portfolio duties. Any changes at the fringes within each period can be managed through collaboration between agencies, enabled by more flexible and modular systems. - Standardised SystemsAgencies must stop going their own way on systems and IT. The Commonwealth only requires one financial system, one HR system, one grants management system, one email system and so on - in fact there are companies larger than the entire Australian Public Service which make this work very effectively at greatly reduced management costs.
With agencies all independently procuring it does fosters a level of market competition (generally between multinationals as these systems are largely provided at scale), but at enormous cost.
Instead government needs to look at framework approaches where vendors can 'plug in' to an overall consistent framework, providing specialist services without the huge expense to agencies OR to the vendors in relentless tender processes.
This will also help with moving people about (when necessary or as career moves), with far less retraining and human errors, as well as faster paths to productivity. - Institutionalise changeFinally, agencies must stop having 'change programs', or 'digital transformation projects' and recognise the reality that change is constant and a stop/start approach with beginnings and endings is not serving them well (for the most part).
We need public service agencies to develop the systems and cultures to manage and thrive in constant change, not to change from A to B over a period, take a break for a few years, then change from B to C, as their environment moves in the same time from A to Z.
Their current approach to change holds it at arms length, treats change as the unnatural state between points of stability when, in truth, the reverse is true.
Change is the constant and brief periods of stability are unusual and becoming rarer. Until this flip in thinking, culture and approaches occurs, government will lag further and further behind and struggle to build the necessary change-resilient systems needed for 21st century good governance.
With that rate of change and uncertainty potentially continuing, it's hard to see how the Australian Government will continue to thrive without taking some of the steps above.
Wednesday, September 21, 2016
Breakthrough or Buddy-up - Two Strategies for Chief Digital Officers | Tweet |
Growth of the Chief Digital Officer (CDO) role has been incredibly rapid over the last few year, reflecting the increasing importance of technology to organisational success and survival.
However not all CDO roles are created equal, with enormous variation in their responsibilities, resourcing and capability to generate change, in the form of digital transformation, in the organisations they serve. Some have direct responsibility for business lines and IT teams, others serve primarily as advocates and influencers in the C-suite, with little in the way of direct reports or operational responsibilities.
The candidates appointed as CDOs have also vary enormously in background, some from 'pure' IT careers, others from a mix of IT and business and still others from business-based disciplines.
An additional complication is that due to there being so many new CDO roles emerging, in many cases both the organisation and candidate are new to the role. This means the definition of the role might not be as clear as for well-established and understood roles, organisations may be less clear on what characteristics they require.
A new CDO must also find their way and negotiate their position in the C-suite in a game of reverse musical chairs, where other executives may be looking for ways to gain advantage from the new seat and player at the table.
In many cases CDOs have been external hires, including from international sources. Some public sector organisations have brought in experience from the private sector, though I've not seen the reverse as yet.
This can add additional complexity to the role. An 'outsider' brings their own cultural and workplace practices, which is often an advantage in a CDO role, but can require a significant adaptive phase for both the Officer and organisation. New CDOs from different environments can require some time to build the relationships and alliances necessary to achieve results and to learn how to navigate an organisation's formal and informal decision-making processes.
When it comes to performing the role successful, there's a spectrum of strategies available to a new CDO.
At one end of the scale there's the 'breakthrough' approach, where the CDO mandates and forces change on an organisation.
At the other end is the 'buddy-up' approach, where the CDO functions as an expert adviser and councillor, supporting colleagues and staff to make change themselves.
I've been fortunate enough to observe both approaches in practice, witness the comparative successes and failures over time.
In this post I wanted to provide a little insight into how these strategies can, and are, applied, the potential outcomes for the choice a CDO makes and what organisations should look for when hiring the right CDO for them.
Looking at the 'breakthrough' approach first - in its purest form this is a 'no holds barred', even violent, way to stimulate organisational change by actively pushing through any barriers to digital transformation.
It requires a forceful and driven CDO with massive resilience who is prepared to take on personal consequences for their strategic approach. Within an organisation it often results in adversarial situations where a digital transformation is imposed on unwilling business and IT areas, ending careers and bruising many survivors.
Internationally many CDOs who have adopted this strategy to a significant extent have had quite short tenures, coming into an organisation and driving digital transformation relentlessly for a year or two, then either moving on to the next appointment or requiring a personal break to rebuild their resilience.
It is not a tactic for executives who wish a long-term career with a specific organisation, or even in a specific industry or country, as the crash through tactics are not congenial to building good long-term relationships and alliances.
Used strategically this approach can break down long-term barriers to change and innovation, squeeze out old-fashioned and outdated thinking and renew an organisation to move forward in a more cost-effective and digital way. Some organisations may require this 'shock treatment' to shift from their current track to a more sustainable one, whereas the buddy-up approach would not provide significant impetus for them to transform.
Used poorly, this strategy can alienate potential allies, damage competent individuals and generate a 'winners and losers' culture, where people feel forced to choose sides. Any resulting digital transformation can be short-lived, reliant on the CDO remaining in their role, with other executives and middle-managers rolling back to their comfort zone after the CDO is gone.
A common tactic for individuals who oppose this approach is to simply wait until the CDO moves on, although sometimes repairing the damage a breakthrough strategy does to trust and respect within an organisation can take years.
The buddy-up approach is far more collegiate and is built on alliances and expertise rather than direct power and force. This strategy is better attuned to patient executives who are willing and able to spend the time building trust and leading executives and staff to a place where they feel empowered to choose adopt digitally transformational changes, rather than having these changes forcefully imposed on them.
The approach builds good long term relations and suits executives who wish to build a long-term career in an organisation or across a sector. It works well in situations where a CDO has little direct power (direct responsibilities or budget) but is a respected key influencer, with peer-level access to others in the C-suite.
The speed of digital transformation achievable using this strategy tends to be far slower, particularly in the initial stages, than via the more aggressive breakthrough approach and may not suit organisations that require a rapid transformation. However, in the longer term, the pace of change can accelerate rapidly as it no longer must be solely driven by the CDO but has become embedded in how the organisation operates.
For organisations with firmly bedded down cultures, there's a risk that the buddy-up approach will get lost in the mix, with the CDO's efforts absorbed into the organisation rather than propagating change. We've seen this many times in the past, where the introduction of a new approach becomes so diluted within the existing culture that, like a drop of ink in a glass of water, it vanishes without a trace.
Used strategically the buddy-up approach is very effective at bringing the organisation with a CDO, generating a deep-rooted top-to-bottom change in culture over time. By avoiding adversarial and 'winner take all' situations, staff across the organisation retain their unity in being on the same team without aggressive competitive, or even bullying, behaviours.
Used poorly the buddy-up approach can be ineffective, with the CDO ignored, or their efforts co-opted and absorbed into business as usual without the level of digital transformation required by an organisation. Also, due to a slower ramp up as trust relations are built, the approach can be too slow for organisations facing imminent threats to their survival.
Fortunately many CDOs understand that their role involves using a blend of the strategies above, based on their resources, influence and environment. Knowing when to apply a breakthrough strategy rather than a buddy-up strategy is the real art of being a CDO, and organisations should be careful to select executives who have demonstrated a careful balance of both, even in situations where one strategy needs to be dominant.
The real danger for organisations - and CDOs - is when they rely too heavily on either the breakthrough or buddy-up strategy.
An over-reliance on breakthrough risks any digital transformation successes being short-term, poorly embedded in an organisation and leading to a 'pushback' that can damage digital initiatives in the organisation for years to come.
An over-reliance on buddy-up can conversely result in a failure to implement the digital transformation required, leaving an organisation in a worse position as its rivals and markets shift.
When hiring CDOs, it's important to not just look at their past short-term successes in transformation, but also their record of fostering enduring digital transformational change and strong relationships.
Those who rely too much on breakthrough tend to have shining successes to their credit, but poor senior relationships and a trail of past engagements where organisations cannot demonstrate significant lasting business value from the CDO's efforts.
CDOs who prefer buddy-up approaches can appear to have less spectacular careers, with most of their successes shared, but come well-recommended and respected. Again it is important to consider if their past engagements have resulted in lasting business value to the organisations they have served.
For those aspiring to be a Chief Digital Officer, it is important to develop the capability to apply both breakthrough and buddy-up strategies, and particularly the emotional intelligence to know which is appropriate to apply. Having experience using both strategies effectively is of enormous benefit when seeking a CDO role.
It's also critical for those stepping into a CDO role to understand and negotiate the use of breakthrough and buddy-up strategies, to ensure that the CEO, Board and other executives understand why the CDO is taking a particular course at a particular time.
A CDO more experienced with buddy-up strategies will need to communicate clearly why the alliance approach to collective change is being applied when working in an organisation that took on a CDO to aid in a rapid digital transformation.
Conversely a CDO selecting breakthrough tactics will need to make it clear why they are choosing an aggressive approach to digital transformation to avoid alienating other executives and staff who may feel trampled or excluded, and losing their mandate before the transformation is embedded.
Most importantly for any prospective or new CDO is the ability to know your own strengths and weaknesses, and seek opportunities where your personal attributes are beneficial to your role.
Using myself as an example, in my roles in large organisations I've often strayed too far into breakthrough territory, reflective of my past experience in business startups, where speed of outcomes is paramount over relationships or process. I've also had several roles where breakthrough was the only viable strategy due to the timeframe and environment.
I have learnt from others, who have mastered the approach, to apply more buddy-up tactics - particularly during my experience in government, where strategic alliances are essential to foster deeper and longer-term digital transformation.
However my natural inclination is more towards breakthrough, and I perform better in environments where, on balance, I can use this strategy more often.
Others may find they naturally prefer to apply buddy-up strategies, or are evenly balanced between the two.
Whatever your personal preferences, you'll likely do best in a role that reflects how you operate.
However regardless of whether you're applying breakthrough or buddy-up strategies, keep in mind the ultimate goal - to redesign organisations to be successful in a digital world.
Organisations live or die by their people, and selecting the right match of CDO and organisation, and the right blend of buddy-up and breakthrough strategies is essential for their digital transformation and success.
However not all CDO roles are created equal, with enormous variation in their responsibilities, resourcing and capability to generate change, in the form of digital transformation, in the organisations they serve. Some have direct responsibility for business lines and IT teams, others serve primarily as advocates and influencers in the C-suite, with little in the way of direct reports or operational responsibilities.
The candidates appointed as CDOs have also vary enormously in background, some from 'pure' IT careers, others from a mix of IT and business and still others from business-based disciplines.
An additional complication is that due to there being so many new CDO roles emerging, in many cases both the organisation and candidate are new to the role. This means the definition of the role might not be as clear as for well-established and understood roles, organisations may be less clear on what characteristics they require.
A new CDO must also find their way and negotiate their position in the C-suite in a game of reverse musical chairs, where other executives may be looking for ways to gain advantage from the new seat and player at the table.
 |
| (Graphic courtesy of CDO Club. Keep an eye out for the Chief Digital Officers Worldwide update for 2016) |
In many cases CDOs have been external hires, including from international sources. Some public sector organisations have brought in experience from the private sector, though I've not seen the reverse as yet.
This can add additional complexity to the role. An 'outsider' brings their own cultural and workplace practices, which is often an advantage in a CDO role, but can require a significant adaptive phase for both the Officer and organisation. New CDOs from different environments can require some time to build the relationships and alliances necessary to achieve results and to learn how to navigate an organisation's formal and informal decision-making processes.
When it comes to performing the role successful, there's a spectrum of strategies available to a new CDO.
At one end of the scale there's the 'breakthrough' approach, where the CDO mandates and forces change on an organisation.
At the other end is the 'buddy-up' approach, where the CDO functions as an expert adviser and councillor, supporting colleagues and staff to make change themselves.
I've been fortunate enough to observe both approaches in practice, witness the comparative successes and failures over time.
In this post I wanted to provide a little insight into how these strategies can, and are, applied, the potential outcomes for the choice a CDO makes and what organisations should look for when hiring the right CDO for them.
Looking at the 'breakthrough' approach first - in its purest form this is a 'no holds barred', even violent, way to stimulate organisational change by actively pushing through any barriers to digital transformation.
It requires a forceful and driven CDO with massive resilience who is prepared to take on personal consequences for their strategic approach. Within an organisation it often results in adversarial situations where a digital transformation is imposed on unwilling business and IT areas, ending careers and bruising many survivors.
Internationally many CDOs who have adopted this strategy to a significant extent have had quite short tenures, coming into an organisation and driving digital transformation relentlessly for a year or two, then either moving on to the next appointment or requiring a personal break to rebuild their resilience.
It is not a tactic for executives who wish a long-term career with a specific organisation, or even in a specific industry or country, as the crash through tactics are not congenial to building good long-term relationships and alliances.
Used strategically this approach can break down long-term barriers to change and innovation, squeeze out old-fashioned and outdated thinking and renew an organisation to move forward in a more cost-effective and digital way. Some organisations may require this 'shock treatment' to shift from their current track to a more sustainable one, whereas the buddy-up approach would not provide significant impetus for them to transform.
Used poorly, this strategy can alienate potential allies, damage competent individuals and generate a 'winners and losers' culture, where people feel forced to choose sides. Any resulting digital transformation can be short-lived, reliant on the CDO remaining in their role, with other executives and middle-managers rolling back to their comfort zone after the CDO is gone.
A common tactic for individuals who oppose this approach is to simply wait until the CDO moves on, although sometimes repairing the damage a breakthrough strategy does to trust and respect within an organisation can take years.
The buddy-up approach is far more collegiate and is built on alliances and expertise rather than direct power and force. This strategy is better attuned to patient executives who are willing and able to spend the time building trust and leading executives and staff to a place where they feel empowered to choose adopt digitally transformational changes, rather than having these changes forcefully imposed on them.
The approach builds good long term relations and suits executives who wish to build a long-term career in an organisation or across a sector. It works well in situations where a CDO has little direct power (direct responsibilities or budget) but is a respected key influencer, with peer-level access to others in the C-suite.
The speed of digital transformation achievable using this strategy tends to be far slower, particularly in the initial stages, than via the more aggressive breakthrough approach and may not suit organisations that require a rapid transformation. However, in the longer term, the pace of change can accelerate rapidly as it no longer must be solely driven by the CDO but has become embedded in how the organisation operates.
For organisations with firmly bedded down cultures, there's a risk that the buddy-up approach will get lost in the mix, with the CDO's efforts absorbed into the organisation rather than propagating change. We've seen this many times in the past, where the introduction of a new approach becomes so diluted within the existing culture that, like a drop of ink in a glass of water, it vanishes without a trace.
Used strategically the buddy-up approach is very effective at bringing the organisation with a CDO, generating a deep-rooted top-to-bottom change in culture over time. By avoiding adversarial and 'winner take all' situations, staff across the organisation retain their unity in being on the same team without aggressive competitive, or even bullying, behaviours.
Used poorly the buddy-up approach can be ineffective, with the CDO ignored, or their efforts co-opted and absorbed into business as usual without the level of digital transformation required by an organisation. Also, due to a slower ramp up as trust relations are built, the approach can be too slow for organisations facing imminent threats to their survival.
Fortunately many CDOs understand that their role involves using a blend of the strategies above, based on their resources, influence and environment. Knowing when to apply a breakthrough strategy rather than a buddy-up strategy is the real art of being a CDO, and organisations should be careful to select executives who have demonstrated a careful balance of both, even in situations where one strategy needs to be dominant.
The real danger for organisations - and CDOs - is when they rely too heavily on either the breakthrough or buddy-up strategy.
An over-reliance on breakthrough risks any digital transformation successes being short-term, poorly embedded in an organisation and leading to a 'pushback' that can damage digital initiatives in the organisation for years to come.
An over-reliance on buddy-up can conversely result in a failure to implement the digital transformation required, leaving an organisation in a worse position as its rivals and markets shift.
When hiring CDOs, it's important to not just look at their past short-term successes in transformation, but also their record of fostering enduring digital transformational change and strong relationships.
Those who rely too much on breakthrough tend to have shining successes to their credit, but poor senior relationships and a trail of past engagements where organisations cannot demonstrate significant lasting business value from the CDO's efforts.
CDOs who prefer buddy-up approaches can appear to have less spectacular careers, with most of their successes shared, but come well-recommended and respected. Again it is important to consider if their past engagements have resulted in lasting business value to the organisations they have served.
For those aspiring to be a Chief Digital Officer, it is important to develop the capability to apply both breakthrough and buddy-up strategies, and particularly the emotional intelligence to know which is appropriate to apply. Having experience using both strategies effectively is of enormous benefit when seeking a CDO role.
It's also critical for those stepping into a CDO role to understand and negotiate the use of breakthrough and buddy-up strategies, to ensure that the CEO, Board and other executives understand why the CDO is taking a particular course at a particular time.
A CDO more experienced with buddy-up strategies will need to communicate clearly why the alliance approach to collective change is being applied when working in an organisation that took on a CDO to aid in a rapid digital transformation.
Conversely a CDO selecting breakthrough tactics will need to make it clear why they are choosing an aggressive approach to digital transformation to avoid alienating other executives and staff who may feel trampled or excluded, and losing their mandate before the transformation is embedded.
Most importantly for any prospective or new CDO is the ability to know your own strengths and weaknesses, and seek opportunities where your personal attributes are beneficial to your role.
Using myself as an example, in my roles in large organisations I've often strayed too far into breakthrough territory, reflective of my past experience in business startups, where speed of outcomes is paramount over relationships or process. I've also had several roles where breakthrough was the only viable strategy due to the timeframe and environment.
I have learnt from others, who have mastered the approach, to apply more buddy-up tactics - particularly during my experience in government, where strategic alliances are essential to foster deeper and longer-term digital transformation.
However my natural inclination is more towards breakthrough, and I perform better in environments where, on balance, I can use this strategy more often.
Others may find they naturally prefer to apply buddy-up strategies, or are evenly balanced between the two.
Whatever your personal preferences, you'll likely do best in a role that reflects how you operate.
However regardless of whether you're applying breakthrough or buddy-up strategies, keep in mind the ultimate goal - to redesign organisations to be successful in a digital world.
Organisations live or die by their people, and selecting the right match of CDO and organisation, and the right blend of buddy-up and breakthrough strategies is essential for their digital transformation and success.
Thursday, September 15, 2016
Farewell to GovSpace.gov.au - a bold and successful government initiaitve | Tweet |
On the 25th August the Department of Finance in Canberra announced that its bold experiment in providing a central website infrastructure for agencies, Govspace, was coming to an end after almost seven years.
I still remember feeling excited at the original launch of Govspace.
At the time I was working in the Department of Health as Online Communications Director.
I was theoretically responsible for the department's entire web presence, although many of the 150+ websites operated by the department were directly controlled by the business area funding their development.
It was still a time when business areas wanted a new website for every new initiative and would pay through the nose for those sites.
Business areas would often spend tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars to digital agencies, or our internal IT team, to have each new site built.
It was a frustrating time for me as there wasn't a simple way for the department to procure low cost sites. We didn't have the capability to easily build or buy websites based on open source web content management systems (WebCMSes), such as WordPress, that used free or cheap themes rather than hand-crafted custom-designed graphical interfaces.
Even Health's internal IT team had to charge six figure sums for simple websites due to the costs they had to incur and offset when using the department's mandated internal web content management platform (Lotus Notes) to deliver them. Each internally built site had to be custom coded and designed by experienced IT staff, making it a relatively slow, as well as expensive, process.
So when the Australian Government Information Management Office (AGIMO) in the Department of Finance unveiled Govspace in March 2010, the floodgates opened.
Suddenly every agency could access a low-cost open source webCMS on pre-approved secure government infrastructure. It could be used to deliver both small specialist websites as well as services such as blogs.
Finance were trusted, reliable, secure and a central government agency - one of 'us' (government) not one of 'them' (private sector companies).
Govspace launched with a single pilot site, the Department of Treasury’s Standard Business Reporting blog. The platform expanded quickly, reaching 25 sites using the platform in a year.
I was one of the first to leap on. I worked within Health to dissuade one of our Communications teams from paying a digital agency at least $40,000 for a new website for an information campaign and convinced them to trust me (and Finance) to make use of the Govspace infrastructure - which at the time came at the very attractive price of 'free'.
Finance was able to spin the site up in a matter of weeks, WordPress was easy to use, so the Comms team was able to directly put the content in place. We had the website live within six weeks - compared to a 3-6 month process with a digital agency.
In the end we did spend some public money, about $42 on a custom WordPress theme, but saved the department over $35,000.
At an internal planning day shortly after the site went live the Comms team proudly shared how easy it had been to get the website in place. This lead to a flood of interest from other area.
That one site raised the internal awareness that the Department had been paying too much for websites, leading to enormous savings over time.
Govspace wasn't designed to cater for every site - it was primarily a platform for simple Gov 2.0-style sites, with blogs and other interactive features. Even so my team helped put at least another half-dozen new websites onto the platform over the next few years.
Even when Finance had to bite the bullet and start charging agencies for the costs they incurred for the platform, Govspace remained one of the lowest cost website options for government.
You can read the posts from the first birthday of Govspace, from AGIMO's then Branch Manager, Peter Alexander (now COO for the Digital Transformation Office) and from AGIMO's Mike T (with my comment still below).
Govspace continued to grow in use over several years, with over 110 government sites using the platform at some stage. The chart below shows the traffic for periods I've been able to source data for.
Over the last few years the site has seen a natural decline as agencies shifted to GovCMS, Drupal or their own lower cost WebCMS frameworks.
Today Govspace hosts 26 live public sites - virtually the same number as the platform had after 12 months.
With Finance's decision to close the platform all those sites will have to move to their own infrastructure by the start of 2017. After that, Govspace will be no more.
While this makes me sad, I support the decision by Finance to close down the GovSpace platform. It had a good run. However Govspace is fast being replaced by more modern web platforms, particularly GovCMS.
I'd like to personally thank all the relevant staff at the Department of Finance for how diligently they ran and maintained the platform, even after AGIMO was disbanded and running a whole-of-government infrastructure stopped being an important role for the department.
While for many inside and outside government the closure of Govspace might be seen as just the termination of a 'surplus to needs' service, I believe this is the end of an era for government IT.
Govspace was instrumental in revolutionising many aspects of how Australian government viewed digital.
The platform helped transform how Australian government agencies looked at website development and costs.
The use of WordPress for a public whole-of-government platform also widened the door for open source software to be considered by agencies.
Farewell Govspace and thank you to everyone involved with the platform. Your contribution to government's digital transformation has not been overlooked.
I still remember feeling excited at the original launch of Govspace.
At the time I was working in the Department of Health as Online Communications Director.
I was theoretically responsible for the department's entire web presence, although many of the 150+ websites operated by the department were directly controlled by the business area funding their development.
It was still a time when business areas wanted a new website for every new initiative and would pay through the nose for those sites.
Business areas would often spend tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars to digital agencies, or our internal IT team, to have each new site built.
It was a frustrating time for me as there wasn't a simple way for the department to procure low cost sites. We didn't have the capability to easily build or buy websites based on open source web content management systems (WebCMSes), such as WordPress, that used free or cheap themes rather than hand-crafted custom-designed graphical interfaces.
Even Health's internal IT team had to charge six figure sums for simple websites due to the costs they had to incur and offset when using the department's mandated internal web content management platform (Lotus Notes) to deliver them. Each internally built site had to be custom coded and designed by experienced IT staff, making it a relatively slow, as well as expensive, process.
So when the Australian Government Information Management Office (AGIMO) in the Department of Finance unveiled Govspace in March 2010, the floodgates opened.
Suddenly every agency could access a low-cost open source webCMS on pre-approved secure government infrastructure. It could be used to deliver both small specialist websites as well as services such as blogs.
Finance were trusted, reliable, secure and a central government agency - one of 'us' (government) not one of 'them' (private sector companies).
Govspace launched with a single pilot site, the Department of Treasury’s Standard Business Reporting blog. The platform expanded quickly, reaching 25 sites using the platform in a year.
I was one of the first to leap on. I worked within Health to dissuade one of our Communications teams from paying a digital agency at least $40,000 for a new website for an information campaign and convinced them to trust me (and Finance) to make use of the Govspace infrastructure - which at the time came at the very attractive price of 'free'.
Finance was able to spin the site up in a matter of weeks, WordPress was easy to use, so the Comms team was able to directly put the content in place. We had the website live within six weeks - compared to a 3-6 month process with a digital agency.
In the end we did spend some public money, about $42 on a custom WordPress theme, but saved the department over $35,000.
At an internal planning day shortly after the site went live the Comms team proudly shared how easy it had been to get the website in place. This lead to a flood of interest from other area.
That one site raised the internal awareness that the Department had been paying too much for websites, leading to enormous savings over time.
Govspace wasn't designed to cater for every site - it was primarily a platform for simple Gov 2.0-style sites, with blogs and other interactive features. Even so my team helped put at least another half-dozen new websites onto the platform over the next few years.
Even when Finance had to bite the bullet and start charging agencies for the costs they incurred for the platform, Govspace remained one of the lowest cost website options for government.
You can read the posts from the first birthday of Govspace, from AGIMO's then Branch Manager, Peter Alexander (now COO for the Digital Transformation Office) and from AGIMO's Mike T (with my comment still below).
Govspace continued to grow in use over several years, with over 110 government sites using the platform at some stage. The chart below shows the traffic for periods I've been able to source data for.
Over the last few years the site has seen a natural decline as agencies shifted to GovCMS, Drupal or their own lower cost WebCMS frameworks.
Today Govspace hosts 26 live public sites - virtually the same number as the platform had after 12 months.
With Finance's decision to close the platform all those sites will have to move to their own infrastructure by the start of 2017. After that, Govspace will be no more.
While this makes me sad, I support the decision by Finance to close down the GovSpace platform. It had a good run. However Govspace is fast being replaced by more modern web platforms, particularly GovCMS.
I'd like to personally thank all the relevant staff at the Department of Finance for how diligently they ran and maintained the platform, even after AGIMO was disbanded and running a whole-of-government infrastructure stopped being an important role for the department.
While for many inside and outside government the closure of Govspace might be seen as just the termination of a 'surplus to needs' service, I believe this is the end of an era for government IT.
Govspace was instrumental in revolutionising many aspects of how Australian government viewed digital.
The platform helped transform how Australian government agencies looked at website development and costs.
The use of WordPress for a public whole-of-government platform also widened the door for open source software to be considered by agencies.
Govspace helped propel government web sites from a 20th century 'brochure-ware' approach to become more engaging and interactive.
The impact of Govspace has echoed across government, and will continue to echo for years to come as agencies continue on their digital transformation journeys.
Farewell Govspace and thank you to everyone involved with the platform. Your contribution to government's digital transformation has not been overlooked.
Friday, August 12, 2016
What follows #CensusFail | Tweet |
I think it is now safe to say that, technically at least, #CensusFail has peaked, with the ABS and IBM successfully restoring most access for the Census 2016 site.
While there are still scattered reports of failures, not recognizing JavaScript is turned on, issues in some browsers and variable levels of access for people with VPNs, by and large the site is limping home.
Increasingly it appears that there was no large denial of service attack on the ABS, just a cascading series of issues which made the census service vulnerable to demand peaks, with perhaps a small attack being sufficient to drive it over the edge.
The repercussions and fallout for the incident will occur for a long time. Several official reviews are already in motion, all of IBM's advertising in Australia remains offline, and the ABS has not changed its engagement and communications course in any perceivable respect.
The ABS is likely to be feeling the initial impacts of the next demand spike - not of census traffic, but of Freedom of Information requests, with journalists, privacy advocates, IT experts and others all interested in understanding what decisions were made, where and by whom.
Hopefully the ABS will scale its capability effectively, unlike the Census experience, or take the high road and proactively release information, including server logs (anonymised of course) that allow external parties to understand the progression of events and clarify what occurred and the good work the ABS did to protect the data of Australians (their key commitment) throughout the incident.
The real risk now is that politicians and ABS management will try to switch back to business as usual too quickly, answering to official enquiries about the incident but refusing to answer to their real owners - Australian citizens. There's a tendency in most organisations to spring back into normal operations to quickly after a crisis, forgetting that the collective external memory is often longer than insiders expect.
The consequences of #CensusFail are likely to have ripples affecting every major government IT project, significantly reducing political and public trust in digital initiatives by many federal agencies, as well as impacting on state and local government initiatives.
In many other digital projects politicians and citizens will ask for additional safeguards to protect against a potential #CensusFail, no matter how unlikely it may be. This will add cost and time to these projects, pushing up IT expenditures at a time when budgets are being cut, causing agencies to delay and defer the more expensive or ambitious projects and attempt to keep limping along on existing infrastructure for just a year or two more.
In extreme cases this may increase risk, with already old systems pushed beyond their commercial lifespans, in broader cases it will harm innovation and cause governments to fall further behind their peers elsewhere in the world.
This seems a bleak picture, but I don't blame the ABS for this. It is a consequence of the lack of political IT expertise we continue to see across many Australian governments and of the risk-averse cultures that continue to flourish across governments despite the increasing downside risk of this stance.
It takes a long time to turn a big ship, and in this instance the ship is Australia. We are not educating our children or adults adequately to master a digital world and we do not have the level of IT knowledge or capabilities we need as yet to sustain a first-world infrastructure.
This flows through our corporations, our public service and our political leadership and it cannot be solved by the import or outsourcing of expertise.
I wish the ABS well in rebuilding their reputation following #CensusFail. In five years when the next Census is held the organisation will still be dealing with the fallout from 2016.
However the real failure and fallout in 2021 will be much greater if Australians have not invested in building our collective digital expertise to the levels we require to continue to grow our national wealth and economy, to sustain our standards of living and maintain our place as a first world democracy.
While there are still scattered reports of failures, not recognizing JavaScript is turned on, issues in some browsers and variable levels of access for people with VPNs, by and large the site is limping home.
Increasingly it appears that there was no large denial of service attack on the ABS, just a cascading series of issues which made the census service vulnerable to demand peaks, with perhaps a small attack being sufficient to drive it over the edge.
The repercussions and fallout for the incident will occur for a long time. Several official reviews are already in motion, all of IBM's advertising in Australia remains offline, and the ABS has not changed its engagement and communications course in any perceivable respect.
The ABS is likely to be feeling the initial impacts of the next demand spike - not of census traffic, but of Freedom of Information requests, with journalists, privacy advocates, IT experts and others all interested in understanding what decisions were made, where and by whom.
Hopefully the ABS will scale its capability effectively, unlike the Census experience, or take the high road and proactively release information, including server logs (anonymised of course) that allow external parties to understand the progression of events and clarify what occurred and the good work the ABS did to protect the data of Australians (their key commitment) throughout the incident.
The real risk now is that politicians and ABS management will try to switch back to business as usual too quickly, answering to official enquiries about the incident but refusing to answer to their real owners - Australian citizens. There's a tendency in most organisations to spring back into normal operations to quickly after a crisis, forgetting that the collective external memory is often longer than insiders expect.
The consequences of #CensusFail are likely to have ripples affecting every major government IT project, significantly reducing political and public trust in digital initiatives by many federal agencies, as well as impacting on state and local government initiatives.
In many other digital projects politicians and citizens will ask for additional safeguards to protect against a potential #CensusFail, no matter how unlikely it may be. This will add cost and time to these projects, pushing up IT expenditures at a time when budgets are being cut, causing agencies to delay and defer the more expensive or ambitious projects and attempt to keep limping along on existing infrastructure for just a year or two more.
In extreme cases this may increase risk, with already old systems pushed beyond their commercial lifespans, in broader cases it will harm innovation and cause governments to fall further behind their peers elsewhere in the world.
This seems a bleak picture, but I don't blame the ABS for this. It is a consequence of the lack of political IT expertise we continue to see across many Australian governments and of the risk-averse cultures that continue to flourish across governments despite the increasing downside risk of this stance.
It takes a long time to turn a big ship, and in this instance the ship is Australia. We are not educating our children or adults adequately to master a digital world and we do not have the level of IT knowledge or capabilities we need as yet to sustain a first-world infrastructure.
This flows through our corporations, our public service and our political leadership and it cannot be solved by the import or outsourcing of expertise.
I wish the ABS well in rebuilding their reputation following #CensusFail. In five years when the next Census is held the organisation will still be dealing with the fallout from 2016.
However the real failure and fallout in 2021 will be much greater if Australians have not invested in building our collective digital expertise to the levels we require to continue to grow our national wealth and economy, to sustain our standards of living and maintain our place as a first world democracy.
Wednesday, June 15, 2016
Digital Disruption: What do governments need to do? | Tweet |
Australia's Productivity Commission has just released it's report on "Digital Disruption: What do governments need to do?".
It's not too long a read. The key findings fit into a few pages, and provides enough of a helicopter view to get a clear view of the direction the Productivity Commission believes agencies should take.
There's implications for every area of government, with many underlying potential impacts on how government operates, how our society functions and how government, businesses and citizens interact into the future.
Some of the recommendations include more assertively addressing risk aversion in government, properly considering the emerging skills needed for public servants and how to train or acquire them, taking a more flexible, iterative and adaptable approach to policy development to address the issue that technology is outpacing decision-making and improved collaboration and sharing throughout government and with external players to ensure the right mix of ideas and skills is in the room for complex decision making.
To make it quickly review, I've included the key findings below:
Impacts of disruption on markets and competition
It's not too long a read. The key findings fit into a few pages, and provides enough of a helicopter view to get a clear view of the direction the Productivity Commission believes agencies should take.
There's implications for every area of government, with many underlying potential impacts on how government operates, how our society functions and how government, businesses and citizens interact into the future.
Some of the recommendations include more assertively addressing risk aversion in government, properly considering the emerging skills needed for public servants and how to train or acquire them, taking a more flexible, iterative and adaptable approach to policy development to address the issue that technology is outpacing decision-making and improved collaboration and sharing throughout government and with external players to ensure the right mix of ideas and skills is in the room for complex decision making.
To make it quickly review, I've included the key findings below:
Impacts of disruption on markets and competition
Finding 2.1
The distinction between services and manufacturing is declining, with design and pre and post sales service parts of the production cycle becoming increasingly important sources of value added. This has implications for:
- the importance of scale in production
- the types of capital firms need
- how much work happens within the firm and how much is outsourced
- the types of jobs that will be created and replaced
- the dynamics of the business cycle.
It also has implications for the National Accounts, including adjusting for changes in quality, and the long term comparability of industry classifications.
Finding 2.2
Clarity in how and when infrastructure investment decisions will be made assists firms that are developing and adapting new technologies. Uncertainty around future technology and infrastructure needs is not a reason for inaction by governments — the costs of inaction, in terms of slower diffusion in technology, can be widespread and significant.
Finding 2.3
Digital technologies are allowing firms to outsource more of their production. This outsourcing is based on access to skills as much as low cost labour, offering greater opportunities to firms in high labour cost economies. Trade policy has been slow to adapt. Substantial increases in outsourcing across international borders may necessitate government attention to:
- secure movement of data across borders
- regulatory requirements for delivery of service exports in other countries
- barriers to outsourcing imposed by differential treatment across industries and products in bilateral and regional trade agreements and in behind the border policies
- workability of rules of origin with many disparate sources of inputs to production.
Finding 2.4
Digital platforms allow households and non market organisations, such as research facilities, to engage more in the market economy by 'sharing' access to their under utilised assets. This poses structural adjustment issues for industries that have traditionally faced little competition due to regulations, such as taxis and short term accommodation. More effective utilisation of under employed assets, whether market or non market, is a positive economic outcome.
Finding 2.5
Digital technologies are changing the sources of market power, with control over data and networks providing new means for firms to hinder entry and extract rent from customers.
- The length of time and extent to which firms can exercise market power is highly uncertain, requiring active monitoring rather than pre emptive action.
- New regulatory tools may be needed to address these very different sources of market power arising with the digital economy. Aspects of third party access regimes could be explored as a relevant approach.
Finding 2.6
Digital platforms can help overcome information asymmetries, which have been a common justification for regulation. This can allow governments to reduce the restrictiveness of regulations seeking to provide consumer protection, subject to confidence in the information provided.
Finding 2.7
Like previous waves of technology, digital technologies should translate to productivity improvements. Indeed, the low marginal cost of replication means that intangible inputs should fall in price, boosting firm profits. However:
- consumers may capture a larger share of growth in productivity where this is delivered in terms of higher quality products, and where enhanced competition drives down prices
- some digital products can be difficult to monetise
- the value of data and networks can result in a winner take all model in some digital services.
Impacts of disruption on workers and society
Finding 3.1
Developments in digital technologies, such as sensors and machine learning, are expected to widen the boundary of the types of tasks that can be automated. But there remain tasks that have proven difficult to automate, including those requiring perception, or creative and social intelligence. Just because a job can be automated does not mean that it will be.
Finding 3.2
The 'gig' economy is in its infancy, making its future effect on the nature of employment uncertain. But if the gig economy develops quickly and its spread is wide, there will be risks that need to be managed. While governments need to address real concerns, blocking these technologies is not an appropriate response.
In the longer term, depending on the scale of change, governments may need to consider whether:
- changes to workplace relations regulations are required to accommodate a growing category of employment
- the income support system needs to be changed to ensure it is not a barrier to workforce engagement and helps reduce income volatility for low income workers.
Finding 3.3
Simply increasing the share of STEM graduates is unlikely to resolve the low rates of adoption of digital technologies by firms. Given the relatively high underemployment of STEM graduates and apparent underutilisation of STEM skills, the current approaches are not delivering the problem solving skills needed for technology rich work environments. Beyond delivering a high competency in literacy and numeracy at the school level, initiatives could include reviewing teaching methods, increasing flexibility of university degrees and improving information on employment outcomes for students to help inform student choice.
Finding 3.4
The automation of many tasks in the workplace, with large labour saving technological advances, has not led to unemployment rates trending upwards over long periods of time. However, there is concern in parts of the community that the pace of change will accelerate, leading to substantial unemployment in the future. But dire employment scenarios remain speculative given the considerable uncertainty about the impact of automation on employment.
Past experience with structural change suggests some workers will find it difficult to secure new jobs. Government should focus their efforts on assisting displaced workers and resist pressure for industry protection or assistance.
Finding 3.5
Wages in Australia have increased at all income levels in recent decades, however they have increased more in higher deciles. Technological change that increases demand for high skilled workers has played a role in the widening of the wage distribution.
Ensuring the benefits from future technological change are shared will be an ongoing policy challenge for government. Raising the supply of skilled workers will be part of the solution, along with the continued role of Australia's tax and transfer system in reducing income inequality.
Implications of disruption for how governments operate
Finding 4.1
The pace of change has implications for how governments undertake regulatory functions. Some regulations and regulatory approaches are explicitly preventing the development and efficient adoption of technologies. In principle, governments should:
- adopt a 'wait and see' approach to new business models and products rather than reacting quickly to regulate what may be unrealised risks
- where relevant regulations already exist
- adopt fixed term regulatory exemptions for innovative entrants that maintain overarching regulatory objectives (as recommended by the Business Set up, Transfer and Closure inquiry)
- use the opportunity of disruption to reform markets where there have been undue regulatory restrictions by removing restrictions that impose a competitive disadvantage on incumbents rather than extend existing restrictions to new business models
- where regulation is needed to manage negative externalities, take a proportionate approach (that is, balance the benefits and costs) and regulate outcomes not technologies.
- take an evidence based approach drawing on Australia's scientific agencies in making assessments of the risks to the community from new technologies
- regularly review regulations affected by digital technologies, especially where an increasing share of activity is mediated through digital platforms
- assign the responsibility for reporting to the parties best able to comply at least cost, and design transparent mechanisms for dealing with complaints.
Finding 4.2
Governments do not necessarily need to be involved in the development of standards, but where standards are mandated (as a form of technical regulation), following good regulatory principles would mean that standards:
- are the minimum necessary to achieve regulatory objectives
- maximise interoperability
- follow international standards where practicable and relevant, unless use of standards based on Australian technology would deliver higher net community benefits
- are developed in consultation with the private sector.
In negotiating international standards, the interests of the Australian economy rather than individual businesses should be of primary consideration.
Finding 4.3
Governments contribute to promoting innovation across the economy by delivering a low cost operating environment for innovative activities. This could include:
- removing disincentives for universities to work collaboratively with business and encouraging the sharing of knowledge
- ensuring transparent policy objectives and predictability in those areas most affected by developments in technologies
- improving the functioning of cities to attract and retain highly skilled workers and innovative firms.
Finding 4.4
To improve the reliability and usefulness of information provided by digital intermediaries governments could:
- reduce regulations aimed at the provision of information on a product or service, where consumers are more effectively able to get this information through another avenue (such as an online rating system)
- encourage digital platforms to develop industry standards to improve the reliability of feedback and right of reply and prevent the use of gag clauses on consumers
- encourage industries to develop a common or standardised language around product offerings to assist consumers in making comparisons
- ensure existing broader governance structures for consumer complaints are sufficient to give consumers and businesses confidence in the use of digital intermediaries.
Finding 4.5
Digital technologies allow for more pervasive collection of data on individuals and firms and can be a medium for harassment and security breaches. This may change what is needed in order to:
- protect individuals privacy
- prevent the unlawful use of information
- maintain the integrity of digital networks.
The case for government action in these areas relies on ensuring that the likely benefits of any restrictions outweigh the costs of restrictions to the community.
Finding 4.6
There remains further scope for regulators to adopt new technologies that reduce the burdens incurred in obtaining regulatory outcomes, undertake more effective risk based assessment, and substantially improve engagement and the targeting of monitoring and enforcement activity.
Finding 4.7
Better information systems and scope to monitor services delivered and their outcomes could improve the efficiency and timeliness of human service delivery by:
- allowing consumer choice to play a greater role in the delivery of human services
- using linked information on services and customers to better target service delivery and introduce more integrated services
- reducing the cost and improving the safety of people involved in areas such as environmental management and emergency services.
Finding 4.8
Technologies embedded in infrastructure and greater use of digital platforms to link infrastructure with users and suppliers offer governments considerable scope to:
- assess infrastructure usage and the responsiveness of demand to pricing and to introduce efficient pricing technology
- augment and maintain public infrastructure in ways that minimise disruption to its use
- optimise investment in public infrastructure, better matching the build requirements to evolving needs.
Finding 4.9
Governments (particularly at a subnational level) have already made increasing use of digital technologies in on the ground service delivery. Some adoption of technology in regulatory processes is also evident. There remain, however, issues that governments need to confront before the benefits of digital technologies can be more widely realised.
- A risk averse culture in the development of policies that are wide reaching within the relevant jurisdiction could be assuaged by measures such as: greater use of policy trials, relying on precedents from other jurisdictions; and drawing on recommendations and advice of independent agencies.
- Skill sets within the public service need to evolve in tandem with technological change. The capacity of agencies to recruit staff with relevant skills and shed those with inadequate skills could be enhanced by more flexible performance management and termination conditions in agency enterprise agreements.
- A sharing of data and cooperation between agencies would improve capacities to solve complex problems that do not fit neatly into the competencies of a single agency.
- Governments need to find ways to:
- exploit, in their program delivery and policy making processes, the increased transparency that comes with digital technologies
- avoid locking in details of policy responses at early stages without scope for genuine re evaluation 'en route' to the end objective.
Friday, June 10, 2016
The increasing importance of role models in the public sector | Tweet |
Role models are incredibly important for humans across both their personal and professional lives.
Role models can help show us and make us believe we can exceed our own boundaries. They can open doors and windows to new ideas, fostering innovation and positive change.
The more restricted and limiting the environment, the more important role models become. They show us where the gaps and opportunities exist and help shine a light on dark paths where many would otherwise fear to tread.
If you doubt humans need role models at every stage in their lives, watch this video showing how even a doll can become a powerful role model for a child - and the movement behind it is helping shift views across society.
The importance of role models is understood by governments, who seek to lift up those that support their agendas. Awards like Australian of the year and Young Australian of the year are examples of how exemplary citizens can be held up as national role models, presenting values and attitudes that we can aspire to share.
The concept of role models is even understood within the public service, where exceptional service and good behaviour can be recognised through awards and speaking opportunities. From the Public Service Medal to the new Public Sector Innovation Awards, role models are recognised to help illuminate the conduct and behaviours that the public sector seeks to encourage.
This is why role models are increasingly important in the public sector. With increasing digital transformation across society, new tools and new problems emerging as sunset industries fade and new ones rise, the public sector's role is changing increasingly quickly.
What does it mean to be a public servant in an era when the customer is kind and every citizen holds a supercomputer in their hand? How does government continue to reinvent itself - its policies, structures, performance criteria and behaviours - to remain relevant and effective in an age when people expect instant customized service?
While I worked in government I was alway conscious of being a role model for digital innovation. My blog made me more visible, but my conduct and work made me an example that others could learn from and follow.
I was also very conscious of the other role models within my sphere who similarly blazed trails, did great work and were held up as exemplars of what public servants could and should do. I continue to admire and be inspired by many of them to this day.
While many of these faces have now changed, in the public service, due to life changes and new opportunities, there's just as many, if not more digital and innovation role models in government today. Whether publicly recognised and held up, like Paul and the team at the Digital Transformation Office, or working within agencies, like the members of the PS Innovation Network, these individuals are modeling the behaviours and conduct the public service needs to adopt to move forward with Australian society.
But what happens if agencies or powerful public sector senior managers see these role models for innovation and change as threats - to their egos, job security or just don't fit their view of how the world they believe they control should operate?
I've seen few acts more cowardly or despicable than cutting down a positive role model for selfish personal reasons, or to preserve and protect a poisonous culture.
Indeed this too becomes a role model, of the worst kind - a negative influence that spreads fear and uncertainty. "If my role model can be cut down, then what could I do" can run the thinking, leading to the growth and spread of a negative 'prisoner' culture where no-one dares to raise their head, challenge poor decisions or demonstrate innovation or leadership.
Yes role models are powerful in the public service - both for the good and the bad.
For the public service to prosper in the digital age, to become agile, adaptable, citizen-centric and innovative, from the heights of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to outlying agencies like CSIRO, from top agency executives to graduates, positive role models must be elevated and negative role models cut without remorse.
To everyone who is a positive role model in the public service (whether you know it or not), everyone who models leadership, innovation, digital expertise and amazing stakeholder and citizen engagement, those who are collaborative, giving and supportive and love helping their colleagues and Australia succeed and grow - I salute you.
Once you grow tired of the good fight and retire the field, do so with honour, knowing that no matter whether you leave by choice or necessity, your impact has been profound, recognised and valued.
Role models can help show us and make us believe we can exceed our own boundaries. They can open doors and windows to new ideas, fostering innovation and positive change.
The more restricted and limiting the environment, the more important role models become. They show us where the gaps and opportunities exist and help shine a light on dark paths where many would otherwise fear to tread.
If you doubt humans need role models at every stage in their lives, watch this video showing how even a doll can become a powerful role model for a child - and the movement behind it is helping shift views across society.
The importance of role models is understood by governments, who seek to lift up those that support their agendas. Awards like Australian of the year and Young Australian of the year are examples of how exemplary citizens can be held up as national role models, presenting values and attitudes that we can aspire to share.
Similarly the importance and practical use of role models is understood by business, by the arts and by not-for-profits, which all hold up those exceptional individuals who model the behaviour that others seek to exemplify, to encourage productivity, ethical conduct, creativity and selflessness.
The concept of role models is even understood within the public service, where exceptional service and good behaviour can be recognised through awards and speaking opportunities. From the Public Service Medal to the new Public Sector Innovation Awards, role models are recognised to help illuminate the conduct and behaviours that the public sector seeks to encourage.
This is why role models are increasingly important in the public sector. With increasing digital transformation across society, new tools and new problems emerging as sunset industries fade and new ones rise, the public sector's role is changing increasingly quickly.
What does it mean to be a public servant in an era when the customer is kind and every citizen holds a supercomputer in their hand? How does government continue to reinvent itself - its policies, structures, performance criteria and behaviours - to remain relevant and effective in an age when people expect instant customized service?
While I worked in government I was alway conscious of being a role model for digital innovation. My blog made me more visible, but my conduct and work made me an example that others could learn from and follow.
I was also very conscious of the other role models within my sphere who similarly blazed trails, did great work and were held up as exemplars of what public servants could and should do. I continue to admire and be inspired by many of them to this day.
While many of these faces have now changed, in the public service, due to life changes and new opportunities, there's just as many, if not more digital and innovation role models in government today. Whether publicly recognised and held up, like Paul and the team at the Digital Transformation Office, or working within agencies, like the members of the PS Innovation Network, these individuals are modeling the behaviours and conduct the public service needs to adopt to move forward with Australian society.
But what happens if agencies or powerful public sector senior managers see these role models for innovation and change as threats - to their egos, job security or just don't fit their view of how the world they believe they control should operate?
I've seen few acts more cowardly or despicable than cutting down a positive role model for selfish personal reasons, or to preserve and protect a poisonous culture.
Indeed this too becomes a role model, of the worst kind - a negative influence that spreads fear and uncertainty. "If my role model can be cut down, then what could I do" can run the thinking, leading to the growth and spread of a negative 'prisoner' culture where no-one dares to raise their head, challenge poor decisions or demonstrate innovation or leadership.
Yes role models are powerful in the public service - both for the good and the bad.
For the public service to prosper in the digital age, to become agile, adaptable, citizen-centric and innovative, from the heights of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to outlying agencies like CSIRO, from top agency executives to graduates, positive role models must be elevated and negative role models cut without remorse.
To everyone who is a positive role model in the public service (whether you know it or not), everyone who models leadership, innovation, digital expertise and amazing stakeholder and citizen engagement, those who are collaborative, giving and supportive and love helping their colleagues and Australia succeed and grow - I salute you.
Once you grow tired of the good fight and retire the field, do so with honour, knowing that no matter whether you leave by choice or necessity, your impact has been profound, recognised and valued.
Monday, May 16, 2016
Digital skills now essential across most government communications roles | Tweet |
Back in 2009 I predicted that government communications professionals only had about 10 years to gain social media skills or become unemployable.
At the time I received quite a bit of scoffing and pushback from senior communications professionals in government. They believed that digital wouldn't grow very fast and would remain a minor component in agency communications. I was told that I was "overblowing the value of social to government" and that their non-digital skills would remain valued for decades into the future.
I reiterated my prediction in 2014 - giving government communications professionals only five more years and broadening the prediction to digital communications skills.
This time the pushback was a lot less, though I still received comments from a few communications specialists. They told me that digital would remain a specialist area and that there would continue to be places across government for professional communicators who neither touched nor understood digital channels.
Recently I've been speaking with several recruiters in the government communications space and they're telling me my prediction was wrong - the change has happened faster than I had predicted.
They've told me that senior communications roles that don't require an understanding of digital or how to integrate digital with traditional communications channels in strategic ways, are now rare.
While digital specialists are still often grouped together in a specific 'Online' or 'Digital' team as a vertical area in communications, an understanding of digital is essential across all government communications officers - whether senior or junior.
As such I'm now calling it on this prediction - I was right about digital becoming an essential skill for communicators, but wrong about the timeframe, being too conservative in how long it would take agencies to embed digital at the heart of their communications. Rather than ten years, it took seven.
This clears the field for me to make a few new predictions.
For example, how long until other government professionals need to have strong digital skills to remain employable. For example I give HR officers two years, policy officers five years at most.
I also expect to see the slow death of dedicated Digital or Online Communications teams. These teams were originally created because digital was 'foreign' to most communicators. These teams required specialist skills and knowledge and, when originally created, worked at a different tempo to traditional communications teams.
However as digital skills become both universally held and required, Digital communication teams become unwanted bottlenecks, as they are split serving every other Comms team in an agency.
Also these teams remain unusual in that they are organised around a channel (online or digital) rather than around a functional goal - such as Corporate, Campaign or Internal communications. We saw the death of 'Television' and 'Radio' teams decades ago (yes they really existed). Even 'Print Publications' teams have disappeared in many agencies.
Therefore I expect to see the number of Digital communication teams slowly fall over the next ten years. They will be reabsorbed back into functional communications teams who now all possess the skills and knowledge that formerly was the domain of a few. Some specialist 'digital' roles will remain, but these will be connected to function, not channel - such as Engagement, Production, Analytics and Design.
So what does this mean if you are a digital communications specialist in government?
In my view you will have two choices.
Either become a hyperspecialist in a particular area of digital, such as analytics, engagement or crisis management, where specialist skills and experience will continue to be valued. You may end up becoming a freelancer, consultant or contractor, providing your expertise on-demand to agencies and other organisations where needed, or retain a role at a larger agency with limited opportunities for growth without stepping beyond your specialisation.
Or broaden your skills to become a strategic communications generalist, who can work across all communications mediums with a high degree of expertise and skill. These are the people who will be promoted in agencies and attract the best contracting and consulting rates, but there will be fierce competition as communications professionals from backgrounds other than digital compete for the same roles.
Time will tell if my new predictions are accurate, or if these changes occur faster or slower than I expect. What you can be sure of is that the communications landscape will continue to change.
Building skill in new mediums and platforms will not be wasted effort. Whereas standing still in the face of rapid change is always a risky proposition.
At the time I received quite a bit of scoffing and pushback from senior communications professionals in government. They believed that digital wouldn't grow very fast and would remain a minor component in agency communications. I was told that I was "overblowing the value of social to government" and that their non-digital skills would remain valued for decades into the future.
I reiterated my prediction in 2014 - giving government communications professionals only five more years and broadening the prediction to digital communications skills.
This time the pushback was a lot less, though I still received comments from a few communications specialists. They told me that digital would remain a specialist area and that there would continue to be places across government for professional communicators who neither touched nor understood digital channels.
Recently I've been speaking with several recruiters in the government communications space and they're telling me my prediction was wrong - the change has happened faster than I had predicted.
They've told me that senior communications roles that don't require an understanding of digital or how to integrate digital with traditional communications channels in strategic ways, are now rare.
While digital specialists are still often grouped together in a specific 'Online' or 'Digital' team as a vertical area in communications, an understanding of digital is essential across all government communications officers - whether senior or junior.
As such I'm now calling it on this prediction - I was right about digital becoming an essential skill for communicators, but wrong about the timeframe, being too conservative in how long it would take agencies to embed digital at the heart of their communications. Rather than ten years, it took seven.
This clears the field for me to make a few new predictions.
For example, how long until other government professionals need to have strong digital skills to remain employable. For example I give HR officers two years, policy officers five years at most.
I also expect to see the slow death of dedicated Digital or Online Communications teams. These teams were originally created because digital was 'foreign' to most communicators. These teams required specialist skills and knowledge and, when originally created, worked at a different tempo to traditional communications teams.
However as digital skills become both universally held and required, Digital communication teams become unwanted bottlenecks, as they are split serving every other Comms team in an agency.
Also these teams remain unusual in that they are organised around a channel (online or digital) rather than around a functional goal - such as Corporate, Campaign or Internal communications. We saw the death of 'Television' and 'Radio' teams decades ago (yes they really existed). Even 'Print Publications' teams have disappeared in many agencies.
Therefore I expect to see the number of Digital communication teams slowly fall over the next ten years. They will be reabsorbed back into functional communications teams who now all possess the skills and knowledge that formerly was the domain of a few. Some specialist 'digital' roles will remain, but these will be connected to function, not channel - such as Engagement, Production, Analytics and Design.
So what does this mean if you are a digital communications specialist in government?
In my view you will have two choices.
Either become a hyperspecialist in a particular area of digital, such as analytics, engagement or crisis management, where specialist skills and experience will continue to be valued. You may end up becoming a freelancer, consultant or contractor, providing your expertise on-demand to agencies and other organisations where needed, or retain a role at a larger agency with limited opportunities for growth without stepping beyond your specialisation.
Or broaden your skills to become a strategic communications generalist, who can work across all communications mediums with a high degree of expertise and skill. These are the people who will be promoted in agencies and attract the best contracting and consulting rates, but there will be fierce competition as communications professionals from backgrounds other than digital compete for the same roles.
Time will tell if my new predictions are accurate, or if these changes occur faster or slower than I expect. What you can be sure of is that the communications landscape will continue to change.
Building skill in new mediums and platforms will not be wasted effort. Whereas standing still in the face of rapid change is always a risky proposition.
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